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The arbitrage practices engaged in by the issuers of municipal
bonds' have been scrutinized by the Treasury Department over the
last fifteen years. Arbitrage traditionally is defined as the simultane-
ous purchase and sale of the same or equivalent securities in order to
profit from the differences in their respective interest rates.2  Munici-
pal arbitrage, however, involves the investment of municipal bond
proceeds which are derived from the sale of tax exempt obligations3 in
higher yielding taxable securities 4 to generate a profit5 rather than to
finance a project constituting a valid public purpose.'
1. Municipal bonds are evidences of indebtedness issued by local governments to
raise money for municipal expenses, beyond the immediate resources of reasonable
taxation. City of Stamford v. Town of Stamford, 107 Conn. 596, 610, 141 A. 891,
896 (1928). The distinguishing feature between a note and bond is that notes are
issued generally with a shorter maturity. Alabama Power Co. v. City of Scottsboro,
238 Ala. 230, 236-37, 190 So. 412, 417 (1939); Muskingum County Comm'rs. v.
State, 78 Ohio St. 287, 301, 85 N.E. 562, 566 (1908).
2. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 110 (3d ed. 1976).
3. Because the interest on municipal bonds is exempt from federal income tax, see
note 12 infra, municipalities have been able to market bonds at a lower yield than
issuers of taxable securities. See SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, FUNDAMENTALS OF
MUNICIPAL BONDS (9th ed. 1972).
4. Municipalities would invest their bond proceeds in Treasury notes. Such notes
are highly secured obligations because they are backed by the taxing power of the
federal government and, therefore, are the highest rated securities. By investing the
bond proceeds in United States obligations, the municipality is assured that the
bondholders' investments are backed indirectly by the federal government. See Com-
ment, The Tax Exempt Status of Local Government Bonds Used in Arbitrary Trans-
actions, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 574, 577 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Tax Exempt
Status].
5. 43 Fed. Reg. 3982 (1978); see also 113 CONG. REC. 31613 (1967); Technical
Information Release No. 840, Aug. 11, 1966, 7 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 6701
(1966). The drafters of the legislation and the Treasury both identified arbitrage
bonds as obligations issued by local governments to make an investment profit.
Municipal arbitrage was an easy and risk free source of revenue for local govern-
ments. According to Sen. Ribicoff, sponsor of the Senate arbitrage provisions, the
profits of an arbitrage transaction were claimed by the municipalities "on the sole
grounds that the local government [lends] its name to the security-without assum-
ing any risk, or responsibility, or work, or anything else." 113 CONC. REC. 31613
(1967).
As an example of an arbitrage transaction, assume a city issues $100 million 30 year
bonds for sewer improvements at a five percent yield. The city would use $10
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The Treasury Department is concerned about the profits generated
by municipal arbitrage7 for two reasons: first, it has determined these
profits cost 8 the federal government more than they benefit state and
local governments9 resulting in a net loss to the federal taxpayer; 10
and second, at the local level, arbitrage bonds crowd the bond mar-
million for the sewer improvements and invest the remaining $90 million in federal
securities yielding six percent. The return on the federal obligations would cover the
cost of the entire $10 million spent on the sewer system. The sewers would be built,
therefore, "without costing the city one cent-the arbitrage between the two interest
rates is buying the sewers." Surrey, Tax Trends and Bond Financing, 22 TAx LAW.
123, 124 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Tax Trends].
6. Although there is no absolute definition of a municipal public purpose, it
generally involves the promotion of "the public health, safety, morals, general wel-
fare, security, prosperity, [and] contentment of all the citizens of the state." Green v.
Frazier, 44 N.D. 395, 401, 176 N.W. 11, 17, aff'd on other grounds, 253 U.S. 233
(1920). See City of Tombstone v. Macia, 30 Ariz. 218, 220, 245 P. 677, 679 (1926).
An essential requisite of a public purpose is that its benefits will affect the inhabitants
as a community, and not merely as individuals. Stevenson v. Port of Portland, 82 Or.
576, 578, 162 P. 509, 511 (1917). The definition of a public purpose is usually a
legislative determination with which courts will not interfere unless there is a clear
abuse of power. Veteran's Welfare Bd. v. Jordan, 189 Cal. 124, 141-42, 208 P. 284,
291-94 (1922); State ex. rel. Graham v. Board of Examiners, 125 Mont. 419, 436-38,
239 P.2d 283, 293-94 (1952). Examples of valid public purposes include the construc-
tion of public roads, Larned v. Burlington, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 275 (1866); redevelop-
ment of blighted areas, Velishka v. City of Nashua, 99 N.H. 161, 106 A.2d 571
(1954); acquisition and maintenance of public buildings, Mims v. McNair, 252 S.C.
64, 165 S.E.2d 255 (1969); harbor improvements, Blaine v. Hamilton, 64 Wash. 353,
116 P. 1076 (1911); construction of bridges, State ex. rel. Knight v. Hamway, 136 W.
Va. 219, 67 S.E.2d 1 (1951).
7. See Treasury Letter from Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant Secretary of Treasury to
the Hon. Wilbur D. Mills, Jan. 23, 1968, 7 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 6183A
(1968). The Assistant Secretary stated that arbitrage practices represented a "clear
distortion of the basic purpose of the interest exemption" and that such transactions
"represent an intolerable waste of federal funds." Id.
8. When municipalities invest their bond proceeds in taxable federal securities, the
federal government becomes "an unintended source of revenue for state and local
governments while losing the opportunity to tax the interest income from its own
taxable bond issues." S. REP No. 552, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. 219 (1969), reprinted in
1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2027, 2254. The federal government does not tax
the interest earned by the municipality, a nontaxable government entity, or the
municipal bondholder, whose bond is indirectly secured by federal obligations.
SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM OF THE TREASURY POSITION,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 117 (Comm. Print 1969).
9. Manvel, Costing Tax Exemption for 'Municipals', 10 TAx NOTES, 796, 797
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Costing Tax Exemption]. The House Report on the Tax
Reform Act of 1969 estimated that the annual cost of the municipal exemption to the
Federal Treasury was $1.8 billion, while the annual interest savings to the states was
$1.3 billion. H. R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 173 (1969), reprinted in 1969
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1645, 1826.
10. Statement of Donald Lubick, Assistant Secretary of Treasury (Tax Policy) on
S. 3370 (Aug. 24, 1978) (reprinted in BNA Tax Management Portfolio 1978).
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ket, drive up municipal interest rates, and compete with those bonds
issued pursuant to a valid public purpose.1
The federal tax exemption afforded municipal bonds12 makes them
an attractive investment and allows the bonds to compete with tax-
able securities which offer higher interest rates. The municipal tax
exemption, however, has been described as "one of the costly prefer-
ences in the federal tax system,"'1 3 and is estimated by the Treasury
Department to have resulted in a $9.4 billion federal revenue loss in
fiscal year 1981.14 As a result of this cost, legislation has been enacted
11. Id. Although the short term arbitrage profits may benefit local governments in
terms of increased revenues, the long term consequences will damage the bond
market and run counter to the interest of municipalities. 43 Fed. Reg. 39822 (1978);
Tax Exempt Status, supra note 4, at 576-77.
12. "Gross income does not include interest on (1) the obligations of a State, a
Territory, or a possession of the United States, or any political subdivision of any of
the foregoing, or of the District of Columbia ...... I.R.C. § 103(a) (P-H 1981).
Authorities are split, however, on the source of the federal tax exemption. The
general view is that the tax exemption has a constitutional basis both in the reciprocal
immunity doctrine and in the federal system of government under which the federal
government does not interfere with the powers and affairs of local governments. See
SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL BONDS 115-19 (9th
ed. 1972). Opponents argue, id. at 116, that the federal government does have a right
to tax municipal bonds under the sixteenth amendment: "The Congress shall have the
power to lay and collect taxes on incomes from whatever source derived, without
apportionment among the several states, and without regard to any census or enu-
meration." U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (emphases added). From the time interest first
became exempt from the federal income tax under the Revenue Act of 1913, numer-
ous unsuccessful attempts have been made to introduce legislation abolishing the
municipal tax exemption. Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 172
(1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1645, 1825.
The.tax exemption was challenged in 1969 when a proposal to establish an alterna-
tive to the exemption through the use of direct federal subsidies was introduced in the
House bill accompanying the arbitrage restrictions. H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 172 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1645, 1825. The
Senate, however, expressed reluctance to interfere with the municipal bond market
and deleted the proposal from the final bill. S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2027, 2029.
13. Costing the Tax Exemption, supra note 9, at 796.
14. Id. The federal government loses money on the municipal bond tax exemption
because the tax savings realized by the holders of the municipal bonds is greater than
the differential between the interest yields on the tax exempt and taxable securities.
S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 218 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2027, 2253. The municipal tax exemption is an "ineffecient" federal
subsidy because it results in a "leakage" of federal revenues to the taxpayer (assuming
the taxpayer would invest in taxable securities rather than in municipal securities).
Gabinet, The Municipal Bond Interest Exemption: Comments on a Running Battle,
24 CASE W. RES. 64, 66 (1972). For example, if a 50% bracket taxpayer purchases a
taxable security yielding $100.00 in interest, the federal government would collect
$50.00 in taxes, and the taxpayer would net $50.00. If, however, the taxpayer
purchased a municipal bond yielding only $75.00 in interest, the taxpayer nets
$75.00 and the federal government collects nothing. The municipality gains $25.00,
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to limit the use of the municipal tax exemption when issuers engage in
arbitrage practices.
Section 103(c) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code)15 defines arbi-
trage bonds as municipal securities which are issued for the purpose of
investing the majority of the bond proceeds in higher yielding secur-
ities, or to replace funds invested at a higher yield and disqualifies
them from tax exemption.16  The Code, however, does not strictly
prohibit all arbitrage practices. Instead, it outlines special municipal
arbitrage rules and exceptions' 7 and empowers the Secretary of the
Treasury to prescribe regulations "as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of the arbitrage restrictions.' 8
Since the introduction of the first arbitrage restrictions in the Tax
Reform Act of 1969,11 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has estab-
lished a series of regulations governing municipal arbitrage. Although
the IRS has sought to prevent what it considers to be arbitrage abuses,
municipal issuers have successfully adapted their financing techniques
to conform to the periodic changes in the regulations. 20
the difference between what it would have to pay in interest if the bond were issued
at the taxable interest rate and what it pays in interest at the exempt rate. The $25.00
difference between the yields on the exempt and non-exempt bonds is retained by the
taxpayer. Id. at 66 n.7 (citation omitted).
15. I.R.C. § 103(c)(2) (P-H 1981) (originally passed as § 103(d), renumbered in
Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1901(a)(17)(B), 90 Stat. 1766).
16. Id.
17. The special rules and exceptions provide that a bond will not be considered an
arbitrage bond if the proceeds are invested for a temporary period pending expendi-
ture of the proceeds, or if a part or all of the proceeds are invested in a reasonably
required reserve or replacement fund. I.R.C. § 103(c)(4) (P-H 1981).
18. I.R.C. § 103(c)(6) (P-H 1981). I.R.C. § 7805 states that, "[e]xcept where such
authority is expressly given by this title to any person other than an officer or
employee of the Treasury Department, the Secretary shall prescribe all needful rules
and regulations for the enforcement of this title ...... When Congress specifically
grants the Treasury Department power to promulgate regulations for a part of the
Code, these regulations are entitled to greater deference by the courts than the
"interpretive" regulations issued under the general authority of the Treasury Depart-
ment pursuant to § 7805. State of Washington v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 656, 675
(1981). See also I.R.C. § 105(h)(9) (P-H 1981), for another example of a specific
Congressional grant of regulatory power to the Treasury Department regarding the
exclusion from gross income of amounts received under accident and health plans.
19. Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 301(a), 89 Stat. 1056 (1969).
20. See Lttr. Rul. 7947117, August 27, 1979. In a description of the administrative
history of the arbitrage regulations, the IRS stated that shortly after the first arbi-
trage regulations were published in 1970, see note 32 inJra and accompanying text,
financial experts formulated a series of techniques to circumvent the regulations.
Through the use of these techniques, local governments were able to comply with the
literal terms of the regulations yet still obtain substantial economic benefits through
arbitrage. The I.R.S. further stated that "while the regulations have been amended
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This Note discusses IRS arbitrage regulations with an emphasis on
those which are designed to control problems involved with advance
refunding bonds-securities issued and invested for the purpose of
retiring a prior, outstanding issue. 21 It also considers the effects of a
recently issued Revenue Ruling, 80-328,22 which prevents state hous-
ing authorities from simultaneously issuing notes and bonds to finance
the same low cost housing projects. Finally, this Note examines the
IRS's restrictive application of the arbitrage regulations in light of a
recent Tax Court decision, State of Washington v. Commissioner,23
which invalidates an arbitrage regulation prohibiting the recovery of
expenses incurred in the issuance of bonds. The effects of Revenue
Ruling 80-328 on state housing construction, and the court's decision
in State of Washington suggest that the IRS may have exceeded its
authority in administering the arbitrage provisions of the Code.
II. The Development of Arbitrage Regulations
Prior to 1966 there were no federal statutes governing arbitrage. At
one point, the Treasury Department even encouraged arbitrage as a
source of federal capital. 24  Excessive arbitrage profits, however,
eventually attracted the attention of the Treasury Department, 5 and
in 1966, the IRS issued a Technical Information Release 26 announcing
that it would decline to rule whether the interest on certain govern-.
ment obligations was exempt from federal tax. The release 27 stated
repeatedly to prohibit these devices, they have not been fully effective in carrying out
the purposes of section 103(c)." Id. (Private Letter rulings are cited for illustrative
purposes only. I.R.C. § 6110(j) (P-H 1981)).
21. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BOND LAWYERS-ARBITRAGE OUTLINES AND MATE-
RALS 6-1 (1981).
22. Rev. Rul. 328, 1980-2 C.B. 54.
23. 77 T.C. 656 (1981).
24. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BOND LAWYERS-ARBITRAGE OUTLINES AND MATE-
RIALS 1-1 (1981).
25. One arbitrage scheme which prompted the Treasury Department. to issue the
News Release, see note 26 infra, was described in a ruling requested by the State of
Ohio. The Ohio Development Finance Commission issued $100 million of bonds-
$10 million of the bond proceeds were used for public purposes, and $90 million of
the proceeds were invested in federal securities bearing a higher interest rate than the
state bonds. The return on this investment provided adequate funds to retire all of
the outstanding bonds, including the $10 million used by the Commission for public
improvements. See Tax Exempt Status, supra note 4, at 575; for an analogous
situation, see note 5 supra.
26. Technical Information Release No. 840, 7 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH)
6701 (1966).
27. This release was the first indication that the federal government was aware
that municipalities were practicing arbitrage and put issuers on notice that the
Treasury Department was planning to implement arbitrage restrictions. See Mum-
1982]
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that this policy would remain in effect until the conclusion of an
examination of municipal obligations which the IRS suspected were
issued for "the principal purpose of investing the proceeds of tax
exempt obligations in taxable obligations ... bearing a higher interest
yield.- 28 In 1969, the Treasury Department recommended that Con-
gress define the limits of arbitrage to provide a clear standard for the
regulation of arbitrage bonds.2 9  In response to this recommenda-
tion, 30 Congress defined arbitrage bonds as
any obligation which is issued as part of an issue all or a major
portion of the proceeds of which are reasonably expected to be used
directly or indirectly-
(A) to acquire securities . . .or obligations . . .which may be
reasonably expected at the time of issuance of such issue to produce
a yield over the term of the issue which is materially higher (taking
into account any discount or premium) than the yield on obliga-
tions of such issue, or
(B) to replace funds which were used directly or indirectly to
acquire securities or obligations described in sub-paragraph (A) .3I
The definition contains various ambiguities, including the meaning of
terms such as "materially higher yield," "proceeds of an issue," and
"temporary period." Thus, temporary arbitrage regulations were is-
sued by the Treasury Department in 197032 in an effort to clarify the
statutory rules33 and exceptions governing permissible arbitrage. 34
ford, Arbitrage and Advance Rejundings, 1976 DuIF L.J. 1239, 1246 [hereinafter
cited as Advance Refundings].
28. Id. The release described two categories of transactions which the Treasury
Department determined were issued for the purpose of generating arbitrage profit:
1. Where all or a substantial part of the proceeds of the issue ... are only
to be invested in taxable obligations which are, in turn, to be held as
security for retirement of the obligations of the governmental unit.
2. Where the proceeds of the issue are to be used to refund outstanding
obligations which are first callable more than five years in the future, and
in the interim are to be invested in taxable obligations held as security for
the satisfaction of either the current issue or the issues to be refunded.
Id.
29. SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM ON TREASURY POSI-
TION, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 117, 118 (Comm. Print 1969).
:30. The arbitrage bill, as drafted by the House of Representatives, did not contain
a definition of arbitrage, and provided that regulations be prescribed by the Secre-
tary of the Treasury. S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 219-20 (1969), reprinted
in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2027, 2254-55. After the Treasury Depart-
ment's request for a "clearer standard", see note 29 supra and accompanying text, the
Senate committee amended the bill to include a definition of arbitrage. CONFERENCE
REP. No. 782, 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2392, 2438-39.
31. I.R.C. § 103(c) (P-H 1981).
32. T.D. 7072, 1970-2 C.B. 12.
33. The temporary regulations, and later the proposed regulations, enabled the
Treasury Department to experiment with arbitrage restrictions before finalizing
[Vol. X
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The temporary regulations were supplemented in 1972 and 1973 by
proposed regulations which attempted to define the ambiguous statu-
tory terms in section 103(c). 35 The proposed regulations, however,
were more restrictive than the temporary regulations; 36 they not only
reduced the permissible yield spread between exempt and taxable
securities, but also limited the authorized methods of computing
yield, thereby reducing the profit issuers 37 could realize on invested
them. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976), requires that general notice of proposed rule making
will be published in the Federal Register. After notice is given, the agency shall give
interested parties, "an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submis-
sion of written data, views or arguments with or without opportunity for oral
presentation." 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976). The Treasury Department, however, did not
issue notice of the temporary regulations or allow the public procedure described in §
553(c) because of the need for immediate guidance for § 103(c). T.D. 7072, 1970-2
C.B. 12, 15. In 1972, after following the necessary notice procedures, the Treasury
Department replaced the temporary regulations with the proposed regulations. T.D.
7174, 1972-1 C.B. 31.
34. The temporary regulations defined "materially higher yield" as the adjusted
yield produced by an acquired obligation which exceeds the adjusted yield by more
than one half of a percentage point. For special government program obligations,
such as student loan notes and housing mortgage notes, the permissible yield spread
was one and one half percent. The proposed regulations also provided a means for
calculating the adjusted yield of an issue, which in turn determines the yield at which
issuers could invest their proceeds. This calculation permitted administrative costs to
be taken into account when determining the bond's purchase price. The purchase
price is a major component in the yield calculation and ultimately affects the yield.
The issuer, therefore, was able to recover the issuance costs because by discounting
the bonds' purchase prices, the issuer could raise the adjusted yield, allowing him a
higher investment return. T.D. 7072 1972-2 C.B. 12.
35. The 1972 proposed regulations defined the "proceeds" of an issue as "the
original proceeds of an issue plus gross repayment proceeds, reduced by the amount
expended for which the bonds were issued, and by a reasonably required reserve or
replacement fund." 37 Fed. Reg. 10946 (1972). The proposed regulations defined
and distinguished between "original," "investment," and "repayment" proceeds. The
proposed regulations also established a means for determining the "reasonable cer-
tainty" that an issuer must have at the time of issuance that the bonds will not be
used for arbitrage purposes. See note 16 supra. When bonds are issued, they must be
accompanied by either a covenant in the bond indenture assuring that the bonds
were not issued for investment purposes, or an opinion of counsel stating that any
investment of the bond proceeds will not violate the arbitrage restrictions. 37 Fed.
Reg. 10946 (1972).
36. The 1972 proposed regulations reduced the permissible point spread used in
determining a "materially higher yield" from one half of a percentage point, see note
34 supra, to one eighth of a percentage point. Prop. Reg. § 1.103-13(b)(5)(i), 37 Fed.
Reg. 10949 (1972). If the bonds were used in an advance refunding, see notes 41-49
infra and accompanying text, the period of investment at the one eighth point spread
is limited to three years immediately preceding the redemption of the first issue.
Prop. Reg. §§ 1.103-(b)(5)(ii),(iii), 37 Fed. Reg. 10949 (1972). For a discussion of the
differences between the temporary and proposed regulations see Ritter, An Analysis
of the New Proposed Regs on Arbitrage Bonds Under Section 103(d), 37 J. TAXATION
164 (1972).
37. The 1972 proposed regulations contained some highly controversial rules.
Therefore, the Treasury Department withdrew them and issued a new set of regula-
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municipal proceeds. The temporary and proposed regulations lacked
the effect of law, but were regarded as effective constraints by munici-
pal issuers3 8 because no municipality wanted to run the risk of having
the IRS declare its issue taxable as a result of noncompliance with the
temporary or proposed Treasury Regulations. 39
Throughout the 1970's the IRS amended the proposed regulations
several times in order to prevent municipalities from engaging in
financial practices which, in the view of the IRS, were aimed at
circumventing the intent of section 103(c) .40 One such practice in-
volved techniques used with advance refundings. 4' The classic ad-
vance refundings practiced prior to the enactment of section 103(c)
enabled municipalities to profit from interest rate fluctuations by
using the proceeds of the new issue to retire outstanding issues sold at
higher interest rates or subject to other unfavorable terms. 42 The
tions in 1973. 38 Fed. Reg. 10944 (1973). The 1973 proposed regulations eliminated
the use of the Investment Bankers Association (IBA) method of computing yield, and
mandated the use of the actuarial method. Prop. Reg. § 1.103-13(c), 38 Fed. Reg.
10947 (1973). The Treasury Department stated that the IBA method could result in a
significant distortion of yield when compared with the actuarial method. See Lttr.
Rul. 7947117, Aug. 27, 1979.
38. Peaslee, The Limits of Section 103(c): Municipal Bond Arbitrage After the
Invested Sinking Fund, 34 TAx L. REv. 423, 427 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Limits of
Section 103(c)]. See also Advance Refundings, supra note 43, at 1247 n.30.
39. In addition to the uncertainty as to the effect of the temporary and proposed
regulations, issuers lacked access to any judicial review of IRS rulings. In order for a
bond issue to obtain an unqualified opinion from bond counsel required by the
regulations to establish the issuer's reasonable expectation that the bond proceeds
would be used for arbitrage purposes, Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13 (a)(2), the financing
had to comply with all of the IRS's regulations and revenue rulings. If the bond issue
did comply, there was no controversy, and thus no basis for court challenge. Limits
of Section 103(c), supra note 38, at 429. The Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
600, § 336, 92 Stat. 2841, however, attempted to rectify this situation by providing a
declaratory judgment procedure available through the Tax Court. I.R.C. § 7478
(1978). This procedure now allows an appeal from a private letter ruling, which is a
written determination regarding the tax exempt status of certain issues pursuant to
I.R.C. § 6110. As a result, the issuers no longer have to issue securities and then have
them declared taxable in order to create a controversy. The availability of declara-
tory judgment reduces the uncertainty among issuers that their obligations may be
declared taxable.
In Investment Annuity, Inc. v. Secretary, 609 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1979), petitioners
brought an action against the Secretary of Treasury seeking a court declaration of
illegality of an IRS ruling regarding the tax treatment of investment annuity con-
tracts. The court cited the purpose and legislative history of this remedy, and noted
that the Senate Finance Committee recognized that an issuer could not market the
bonds if there were any questions as to their tax exempt status. Id. at 10 n.45.
40. 43 Fed. Reg. 39822 (1978). See also note 20 supra.
41. Id. The Treasury Department announced that advance refundings had cre-
ated most of the IRS's difficulties enforcing the arbitrage regulations. Id.
42. As an example of refunding before the enactment of § 103(c), assume a county
needed to acquire additional funds for a hospital extension project. The county
666 [Vol. X
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proceeds of the advance refunding issue, after a period of investment
in Treasury obligations, 43 are used to retire the prior outstanding
issue. 4 4 Municipalities could generate large arbitrage profits by issu-
ing advance refunding bonds because considerable sums of money are
invested in Treasury obligations for long periods of time.
The Treasury Department objected to these arbitrage profits on the
theory that they double the amount of tax exempt bonds outstanding
for any project, flood the bond market, and result in higher interest
rates. 45 As borrowing costs increase, local governments may not be
able to issue debt as frequently as necessary to finance essential gov-
ernment services. 40 The 1972 proposed regulations curtailed the
profits which could be realized by limiting the interest spread between
the refunding issue and the Treasury obligations to one eighth of one
percent.
47
In 1975, the Treasury Department attempted to eliminate any
arbitrage profits generated through advance refundings. 48 The yield
restrictions were amended to limit further the permissible difference
between interest paid on advance refunding issues and on the interest
already had a series of revenue bonds outstanding and the bond resolution prohibited
a second lien on the hospital's revenues. The county issued an advance refunding to
retire the first lien revenue bonds, and then issued another series of hospital revenue
bonds which now had the status of first lien bonds rather than as second lien bonds.
The county also benefited from lower interest rates in effect at the time the second
series of bonds was issued and from investment profits earned while the advance
refunding issue was invested.
43. If an issuer issues a $1,000,000 ten-year bond at 4.5% interest compounded
semiannually, the issuer would have to pay the bondholder $1,560 by maturity. If,
however, the issuer immediately invested the proceeds at 6% interest, the municipal-
ity would earn $1,906. The issuer's revenues would then exceed his obligations,
allowing him to begin reducing principal. In an advance refunding, the bonds are
issued and invested in higher yielding securities before the first issue has matured.
The second issue can, therefore, act as a revenue generating investment. Advance
Refunding, supra note 27, at 1241.
44. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BOND LAWYERS-ARBITRAGE OUTLINES AND MATE-
RIALS 6-1 (1981). The two outstanding issues often are necessary because the original
issue may not be subject to repayment until after the refunding bonds are issued. If
the outstanding issue was retired immediately with the proceeds of the new issue, ihe
transaction was called a refunding issue. Id. at 6-2.
45. 43 Fed. Reg. 39822 (1978).
46. Id.
47. See note 36 supra. If the interest spread was any greater, the proceeds of the
issue would be regarded as proceeds used to acquire securities producing a yield over
the term of the issue which is "materially higher" than the yield on the issue itself.
and the bonds would become arbitrage bonds.
48. The 1975 amendments made any difference between the yield on advance
refunding bonds and yield on securities in which the proceeds were invested a
"material" difference. Prop. Reg. § 1.103-13(b)(5), 40 Fed. Reg. 56448 (1975).
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paid on the purchased Treasury obligations. Since the proceeds of an
advance refunding could not be invested in higher yielding securities,
an issuer realized no profit on the investment. 49
The last major amendments were made to the proposed regulations
in 1978.50 These amendments further restricted the yield calculation
formula by eliminating the issuer's ability to recover administrative
costs, 51 and regulating the investment of the issuer's sinking fund.52
49. To comply with the regulation, some municipalities would enter into agree-
ments with underwriters to pay artificially high prices for the securities purchased
with the refunding proceeds. The high prices paid for the acquired security would
make the security a premium bond and lower the investment yield on the security.
The issuer would, therefore, be in accordance with the low yield restrictions required
by the regulations, and the underwriter would reap a "windfall profit." If the issuer
issues a refunding bond with an interest rate of 5%, the regulations require that he
invest the proceeds in securities with approximately the same 5 % yield. However, an
underwriter could purchase a $100 bond on the market yielding 10 % and sell it at an
artificial premium to the issuer for $104.70. The premium price would reduce the
bond's 10% yield to the issuer to 5%. The $4.70 windfall would go to the under-
writer. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BOND LAWYERS-ARBITRAGE OUTLINE AND MATE-
RIALS 6-19 (1981). Some underwriters donated the profits which they made through
advance refunding to charities, Advance Refunding, supra note 43, at 1249. Congress
passed legislation in 1978 designed to protect underwriters and their issuers who
donated "windfall profits" to charities from tax penalties. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-600, § 337, 92 Stat. 842. Although the issuers could no longer retain
arbitrage profits from the advance refundings, the financings were still practiced
because the interest rates were lower in the mid-1970's than in the early 1970's. Also,
whereas the proposed regulations prohibited arbitrage profits through investment of
the major portion of the proceeds of the refunding issue, the regulations did permit a
minor portion of the proceeds to be invested at a higher yield for a temporary period.
Prop. Reg. § 1.103-14, 38 Fed. Reg. 10949 (1973). Consequently, issuers still could
obtain some arbitrage advantages through advance refundings. Advance Refundings,
supra note 43, at 1248. The Treasury Department again amended the proposed
regulations in 1976 to eliminate the possibility of windfall profits by implementing
the "Market Price Rules," Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(c)(2)(ii). See Advance Refundings,
supra note 43, at 1251. The rule provided that when an issuer purchases obligations
from an underwriter, with the proceeds of an advance refunding issue, the yield on
the acquired obligation had to be computed using the market price of the obligations,
thus preventing any artificial premium or discount. See Rev. Rul. 92, 1980-1 C.B. 31
(amounts in excess of the fair market value paid for acquired obligations from the
proceeds of advance refunding bonds may not be considered in determining whether
the arbitrage yield restrictions are met). The practical effect of the rule is that
proceeds of advance refunding issues only can be invested in specially designed
federal securities to ensure that the investment does not exceed the permissible yields.
These special governments obligations, State and Local Government Series (SLGS),
were formulated by the Treasury Department to enable local governments to fix the
yield on the SLGS so that the invested municipal bond proceeds will comply with the
yield restrictions. 31 C.F.R. § 344 (1981). Advanced Refundings, supra note 43, at
1250-51.
50. 43 Fed. Reg. 39822 (1978). For a discussion of the 1978 amendments see Gill,
Arbitrage, 12 Unn. LAW. 534 (1980).
51. Administrative costs incurred by municipalities during advance refundings
could no longer be considered in determining whether the obligations were premium
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These amendments also prohibited any transaction that the IRS
deemed to be an "artifice or device."'5 3 These financings exploit the
interest differential between tax exempt and taxable securities to
achieve a material financial advantage. This provision was directed at
the increasingly sophisticated financing techniques developed by mu-
nicipalities which enabled the municipal issuer to increase arbitrage
profits without actually violating the regulations.5 4 If the IRS deter-
mines that a financing technique is an artifice or device, the bonds are
deemed to be arbitrage bonds, and lose their tax exempt status. For
example, in one revenue ruling applying the artifice or device rule,
the IRS held that a municipality violated the rule when it issued
refunding bonds and allowed the entire prior issue to remain out-
standing until maturity, rather than gradually reducing principal and
interest. The IRS determined that this transaction allowed the prior
issue to remain outstanding longer than necessary, thereby increasing
the burden on the tax exempt market.5 5
or discount bonds for the purposes of computing yield. See note 34 supra. Instead, the
yield calculation had to be determined by the bond's initial offering price to the
public. See also I.R.C. § 1232(b)(2) (P-H 1981). Therefore, issuers could no longer
recover proceeds spent on administrative costs by using the costs in computing the
yield on the issue. See 43 Fed. Reg. 39823 (1978).
52. A municipal sinking fund is a special fund, set apart from the other funds of an
issue, which is used to retire the municipality's debt. The interest accumulated by the
investment of the sinking fund is used to retire a portion of the municipality's debt.
Generally, municipal obligations have serial maturities and a portion of the principal
often is paid off gradually over a long period of time through the use of a sinking
fund. A common practice during the 1970's was the "invested sinking fund." Instead
of using the amount deposited in the sinking fund to retire principal serially on an
annual basis, issuers would leave all of the bonds outstanding until the latest maturity
date, and keep the deposits in the sinking fund and its accumulated interest invested
in higher yielding securities. This practice often resulted in substantial arbitrage
profits. The Treasury Department objected to invested sinking funds because the
result of this financing device was that bonds were left outstanding longer than
necessary. The Treasury Department also believed that many financings were moti-
vated chiefly by the investment advantages presented by the invested sinking fund.
43 Fed. Reg. 39822 (1978). The amendment restricted the yield on the investment of
any invested sinking fund not emptied out on an annual basis. Treas. Regs. § 1.103-
13(b)(5)(vii); § 1.103-13(g); § 1:103-14(b)(8).
53. 43 Fed. Reg. 39823 (1978). See Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(j) (1981).
54. Statement of Assistant Secretary of Treasury (Tax Policy) on S.3370 (Aug. 24,
1978) (reprinted in BNA Tax Management Portfolio 1978). The Treasury Depart-
ment stated that sophisticated financing devices used to circumvent the effects of the
arbitrage regulations were used most frequently with advance refundings.
55'. See Rev. Rul. 345, 1979-2 C.B.44. An issuer employs an artifice or devise if, by
issuing refunding bonds he fails to comply with the indenture requirements to
redeem semiannually'a specified percentage of the principal of the bonds and allows
the entire outstanding principal to remain outstanding until maturity). See also Rev.
Rul. 13, 1980-1 C.B.27, 29. An issuer employs an artifice or device if it issues bonds
to finance a feasability study and the state is expected to appropriate funds annually
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The 1978 amendments, along with the existing proposed regula-
tions, were finalized and adopted by the Treasury Department in
1979.50 The increasingly restrictive nature of the arbitrage regula-
tions demonstrates the tension existing between the IRS and the issuers
of municipal bonds.5 7 As the IRS attempted to eliminate arbitrage
profits from municipal financings, 5 it has been confronted with "the
continuing resilience of issuers and their advisors in the face of a
blizzard of arbitrage rules." 59  Municipalities continued with financ-
ings which complied with the regulations, but which permitted the
investment of at least part of the bond proceeds in higher yielding
securities. 0 These creative financing methods motivated the IRS to
announce that its "stance vis-a-vis the bond market was one of 'height-
ened vigilance.' "61 The IRS asserted a right to selective taxability,
which would allow it to declare bond issues taxable when it believed
equal to the cost of the study in any given year. The IRS held that the issuance of the
bonds is not necessary and creates a burden on the tax exempt market.
56. 40 T.D. 7627, 1979-2 C.B. 45.
57. In 1978, Bill S.3370 was introduced in Congress to provide for a year and one
half suspension of all Treasury rulings and regulations by the IRS regarding munici-
pal bonds. Sen. Bentsen, who introduced the bill, expressed concern that the IRS's
interpretations of the tax laws had reached a point where they began to "frustrate
efforts of state and local governments [in carrying] out their normal financings and
administration of public funds." The Senator was particulary concerned about the
impact that the Treasury Regulations would have on student loan programs. Id.
124 CONG. REC. S23895 (1978). The bill later died in the Senate Finance Committee.
See Limits of Section 103(c), supra note 38, at 430 n.ll.
58. The IRS also began to develop a ruling policy aimed at enforcing the replace-
ment restrictions described in § 103(c)(2)(B) of the Code preventing a municipality
from using funds to acquire higher yielding securities and then issuing bonds to
replace the funds invested in the securities. Replacement differs from refunding issues
because replacements often involve funds from sources other than bond proceeds. If
nonbond proceeds are invested in materially higher yielding securities, and the
issuers use the proceeds of an obligation to invest materially higher yielding secur-
ities, thereby freeing up the invested nonbond funds for expenditure, the issue is a
replacement issue. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BOND LAWYERS-ARBITRAGE OUT-
LINES AND MATERIALS 7-1 to 7-8 (1980). See also Limits of Section 103(c), supra note
38, at 442-52. For an example of the "requisite nexus" between the bond proceeds
and the funds which are replaced, see Rev. Rul. 348, 1978-2 C.B. 95 (certain
securities pledged as collateral for municipal bonds are subject to replacement restric-
tions).
59. Limits of Section 103(c), supra note 38, at 429.
60. Id. at 430.
61. Barrons, Aug. 25, 1980, at 29, col. 2. This statement was directed at what the
Treasury Department considered to be abuses of the municipal exemption, particu-
larly the use of tax exempt issues to finance single family 'housing mortgages. The
Treasury Department also alleged that sophisticated financings had developed which
prevented the Department from fully enforcing the regulations and enabled issuers to
realize arbitrage profits in spite of the regulations. Id.
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they violated the regulations.6 2 This policy of selective taxability was
intended to slow down what the Treasury Department considered to
be a "rash of abuses in the tax exempt market. 6 3
III. IRS "Enforcement" of Arbitrage Restrictions
Two methods the IRS uses to administer Code provisions are reve-
nue rulings and private letter rulings.64 Revenue rulings, the IRS's
application of the tax law to a general fact situation, do not have the
force of law but may be cited as precedent. 65 Private letter rulings,
however, apply only to the taxpayer who requested the opinion and
may not be used as precedent. 6 While revenue rulings are regarded
by municipal issuers as the official IRS position on the Code and on
the tax regulations, private letter rulings are directed only at limited
fact situations. Nevertheless, both revenue rulings and private letter
rulings have had an effect in shaping municipal financings.
A. Revenue Ruling 80-328
Shortly after announcing its policy of selective taxability, the IRS
issued Revenue Ruling 80-328.67 The ruling68 held that the simulta-
neous issuance of short term notes and long term bonds causes the
short term notes to be arbitrage bonds within the meaning of section
103(c) of the Code. This financing practice had been used by state
housing authorities to finance low income, multi-family housing. 69
62. Id. The Assistant Secretary of the Treasury stated that a declaration of taxabil-
ity of a municipal issue would put issuers who are trying to exceed the permissible
limits set by the regulations on notice and slow down questionable financings. Id.
63. Id.
64. See generally INTRODUCTION, 1980-2 C.B. iii.
65. Id.
66. I.R.C. § 6110(j)(3) (P-H 1981).
67. Rev. Rul. 328, 1980-2 C.B. 54. This discussion will be limited to Situation 2
presented in the ruling which deals with obligations issued for multi-family housing
programs.
68. The fact pattern in the Revenue Ruling is as follows: $76,000,000 of three year
term notes were issued at a 7 % yield, and pending disbursement, the majority of the
funds were invested at an unrestricted yield of 8.5 % pursuant to IRC § 103(c) (4). At
the same time, $80,000,000 of 30 year term bonds were issued at a yield of 9 % and
invested at a restricted yield of 9 % pending retirement of the notes. The bonds would
be used to retire the notes and secure long term-financings for the housing projects.
Id.
69. The construction projects are eligible for assistance payments under § 8 of the
U.S. Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1976). Rev. Rul. 328, 1980-2 C.B. 54,
54. Consequently, many of the financings must be structured in accordance with
HUD's policies. See note 79 infra. One of these policies requires that construction of
the projects be completed by the date of the notes' maturity. Alexander, Gribetz, &
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As a result, Revenue Ruling 80-328 has had a particularly adverse
affect on the construction of public housing.70
In this type of construction project, an authority would simultane-
ously issue short term notes of up to three years7' and long term bonds.
The proceeds of the notes, which bear a lower interest rate than the
bonds, are used by issuers to provide a loan to the project developer to
finance construction costs. The notes remain outstanding for the pe-
riod of construction. Before the note proceeds are expended, however,
they are invested temporarily in higher yielding Treasury obligations.
The bonds bear a higher interest rate than the notes and are invested
in restricted yield securities (SLGS) 72 while the notes remain outstand-
ing. After completion of the project, the proceeds of the bonds are
used to redeem the notes.
The IRS argued that this financing method was a "replacement"
device in violation of section 103(c) because the notes and bonds were
issued for the same project, and the notes replaced the bonds, thus
freeing the bond proceeds for arbitrage investment purposes. 73 The
IRS also contended that the issuance of the notes constituted an overis-
suance,74 unnecessarily increasing the amount of tax exempt securities
on the market. The IRS maintained that the proceeds of the bonds
alone were sufficient to finance the project.7 5 Finally, the IRS deter-
Nicholls, Arbitrage Issues Raised by IRS Concerning Contemporaneous Issuance of
Bonds and Notes to Finance Multi-Family Housing, 1 MUN. FIN. J. 273, 283 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Arbitrage Issues].
70. See note 83 infra.
71. Treas Reg. § 1.103-10.
72. See note 49 supra.
73. See note 58 supra. Although the bonds have a higher yield than the notes and
ordinarily can be invested in higher yielding securities, they are nonetheless subject to
the lower yielding investment restrictions of the notes. Because the bond proceeds do
not comply with these investment restrictions, they are considered to be invested at a
"'materially higher yield" in violation of I.R.C. § 103(c). Rev. Rul. 328, 1980-2 C.B.
54, 55.
74. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(b)(5)(iv). This regulation provides that if the proceeds
of an issue exceed the amount necessary for the government purpose by more than
5%, the bonds are an overissuance and are subject to a more restrictive yield
formula:
Y + [($5,000 x Y) + P] where-
(1) "Y" stands for the yield on the issue, and
(2) "P" stands for the amount of original proceeds of the issue.
Rev. Rul. 328, 1980-2 C.B. 54, 56. The IRS stated that the economic effect of issuing
notes and bonds at the same time is equivalent to the use of the proceeds of the 9 %
bonds to provide for the project and the investment of the proceeds of the tax exempt
7 % notes in taxable securities yielding 9 %, and used the arbitrage gain to reduce the
borrowing costs during the interim construction period by 2 %. Id. at 56.
75. Rev. Rul. 328, 1980-2 C.B. 54, 55, states that because long term financing for
the project already will be secured by the bond issue at the time the notes are issued,
interim financing is not necessary for the project. Id. at 55.
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mined that this financing technique violated the artifice or device
regulation by allowing the housing authority to use the difference
between the tax exempt interest rate and taxable interest rates to
reduce its costs. The IRS reasoned that because the housing authority
used the proceeds of the lower yielding notes, rather than the invested
proceeds of the higher yielding bonds to finance the project, the cost
reduction was a material financial advantage achieved by exploiting
the difference between tax exempt and taxable securities.
76
This revenue ruling raises several questions regarding the IRS's
restrictive application of the arbitrage regulations. State housing au-
thorities argue that the simultaneous issuance of notes and bonds is not
a device aimed at circumventing the arbitrage restrictions, but a
necessary financing technique which has been accepted by the busi-
ness community 77 and recommended by the Department of Housing
and Urban Development.78 The housing authorities claim that finan-
cial realities require simultaneous issuance because the transaction is
an effective means of reducing construction costs and stabilizing inter-
vst rates on the developers' long term mortgages. 7  They argue that
the financing does not constitute an overissuance because the reduc-
tion of project costs through the use of the interest rate differential
serves a valid public purpose. 80 The primary purpose of the financing
76. Id. at 56.
77. See Arbitrage Issues, supra note 69, at 276.
78. Id.
79. HUD's policies require that permanent mortgage rates be fixed for the devel-
opers before project construction begins. The housing authorities have been comply-
ing with this policy by issuing bonds along with the notes and securing long term
financing of the mortgages with the bond proceeds at the beginning of construction.
This practice assures the developers that the interest rates on the mortgages will not
increase due to market fluctuations. Memorandum, Arbitrage Issues Raised by Inter-
nal Revenue Service Concerning Contemporaneous Issuance of Bonds and Notes to
Finance Multifamily Housing, 6-8 (Mudge Rose Guthrie & Alexander, Apr. 14,
1981), cited in 12 TAx NOTES 1011-12 (May 4, 1981).
Another reason for securing long term financing at the outset of the project
through the issuance of bonds is to assure that long term investors exist for the
permanent financing of the project. This eliminates the risk that at the end of the
three year construction period the mortgagors will default for lack of long term
financing. Id.
80. See note 6 supra. In this situation, the general public purpose is providing low
income housing. Keeping construction costs down aids in the promotion of that
purpose. Arbitrage Issues, supra note 69, at 279. If the contemporaneous issuance of
notes and bonds is not permitted, financing the project becomes more expensive and
the higher costs are passed on to the contractors. Consequently, greater federal
expenditures on rental subsidies must be provided through HUD. The result is a
reduction in the number of housing units available for low income citizens and a less
efficient use of HUD rent subsidies. Use of public funds to provide for low cost
housing has been held constitutional as an expenditure in the interest of the general
public. Kleiber v. San Fransisco, 18 Cal. 2d 718, 117 P.2d 657 (1941); Roe v.
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technique is to furnish low cost housing for low income citizens.8'
Any minor arbitrage advantage resulting in cost reduction which
issuers realize by using the technique are incidental and not the moti-
vating factor behind the transaction.82
The IRS's stance toward this financing technique resulted in the
cancellation and restructuring of several housing issues, considerable
financial loss, and construction delay. 83 In light of Revenue Ruling
80-328's detrimental effect on state housing construction, and the
important business reasons and policy requirements which this tech-
nique accomodates, it seems inappropriate for the IRS to rule that this
method constitutes an arbitrage violation within the meaning of sec-
tion 103(c).84
B. Private Letter Rulings
The IRS has issued several private letter rulings85 in which it deter-
mined that contemporaneous issuances of notes and bonds were not
arbitrage violations.8 6 In one ruling,87 a housing agency issued notes
Kervick, 42 N.J. 191, 199 A.2d 834 (1964); Belevsky v. Redevelopment Auth., 357
Pa. 329, 54 A.2d 277 (1947); Housing Auth. v. Higginbotham, 135 Tex. 289, 143
S.W.2d 79 (1940).
81. See CHAIRMAN'S MESSAGE, NEW YORK STATE HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY-AN-
NUAL REPORT 3 (1980).
82. See Arbitrage Issues, supra note 69, at 276. The issuers claim that by
contemporaneously issuing notes and bonds, the issuer is taking advantage of the
interest differential between long term and short term financing. By issuing short
term, low interest notes, the issuer is able to reduce the interest costs incurred during
construction, thereby reducing the overall costs of the project. This cost reduction is
passed on to developers in the form of lower interest rates on their mortgages. Id. at
279.
83. The IRS's announcement that it was studying the financing technique
prompted the New York State Housing Finance Agency to postpone the sale of a
$77,795,000 bond issue and to cancel the sale of $73,905,000 bond anticipation notes,
which were to be issued at the same time as the bonds. Similarly, the Massachusetts
Housing Finance Agency issued $50,000,000 of housing bonds, but cancelled
$40,925,000 housing notes. The Daily Bond Buyer, Jan. 15, 1981, at 12, col. 4.
84. If the "primary purpose" of the issuer in this situation is to generate arbitrage
profits, he would produce more investment profits by using the more traditional
advanced refunding techniques, rather than by simultaneously issuing notes and
bonds. If the municipality issued notes alone, and later issued bonds to refund the
notes, he could keep the proceeds of both issues invested at unrestricted rates for
longer periods of time. Arbitrage Issues, supra note 69, at 277-78.
85. IRC § 6110(j)(3) (P-H 1981), states that private letter rulings, which are
directed only to the taxpayer who requested a written determination, may not be
cited as precedent.
86. See Lttr. Rul. 8107038, Nov. 19, 1980; Lttr. Rul. 8113030, Dec. 30, 1980. The
financing techniques used by the housing authorities in these rulings are essentially
the same as in Rev. Rul. 328, 1980-2 C.B. 54.
87. Lttr. Rul. 8107038, Nov. 19, 1980.
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and bonds to provide financing for a multi-family housing project.
The note proceeds were used to secure a mortgage loan for the project,
and the bond proceeds were invested temporarily in higher yielding
securities until they were needed to refund the notes. Because the
project was not completed by the time the notes matured, two new
series of notes were issued.8 8 Unlike the notes in Revenue Ruling 80-
328, the new series yielded approximately two percent more than the
federal securities in which the bond proceeds were invested.
The IRS ruled that because the new series of notes bore a higher yield
than the bond proceeds, the notes were not arbitrage bonds. Although
the IRS indicated that the new series was an overissuance, the notes did
not violate the regulations because, unlike the notes in Revenue Ruling
80-328, their proceeds were not invested at a "materially higher yield."
Finally, the IRS stated that because the authority lost money on the
transaction, rather than realizing a material financial advantage in the
form of reduced project costs,"9 the financing did not constitute an
artifice or device. 90  ..
The IRS's position on the simultaneous issuance of notes and bonds
may be counterproductive. Any short term increase in federal reve-
nues may be offset by a long term decrease in federal tax revenues
resulting from the IRS's enforcement of Revenue Ruling 80-328. By
refusing to permit the housing authorities to reduce costs through the
contemporaneous issuance of notes and bonds, the IRS may be forcing
the authorities to issue additional bonds to cover the projects' costs.
The Treasury Department must then exempt the interest on these
additional tax free bonds which will be outstanding at higher interest
rates and for longer periods of time.9'
88. Id. In this ruling, the bond resolution stipulated that the bond proceeds could
not be used to refund the notes until after the project was completed and endorsed by
HUD. Because the project was not completed and endorsed by the time the notes
matured, a second series of notes were issued to refund the original notes. After
issuing the new notes, the project was still not endorsed by HUD, so the authority
planned a third series of notes to redeem the original notes.
89. The Housing Authority in Rev. Rul. 328, 1980-2 C.B. 54, saved money
through reduced construction costs. See note 82 supra.
90. Lttr. Rul. 8107038, Nov. 19, 1980.
91. By preventing housing authorities from reducing construction costs through
the use of long term bonds and short term notes, the IRS may force the authorities to
issue more bonds than they normally would need. An analogous situation is presented
in State of Washington v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 656 (1981), where an issuer
challenged the IRS's regulation against issuers discounting their administrative costs.
The court observed that by insisting on the enforcement of this regulation, the
Treasury Department was pursuing a Phyrric victory. Although the federal govern-
ment may save a small amount of money if municipalities are prevented from
recovering administrative expenses, the ultimate result is that municipalities will
issue more bonds to cover the costs of issuance, and the Treasury will have to exempt
interest on these additional bonds for decades. Id. at 674 n. 18.
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The IRS's overreaction to sophisticated financing methods such as
the simultaneous issuance of notes and bonds may be a result of its
policy of "heightened vigilance" 92 toward the bond market. Unfortu-
nately, in the Treasury Department's attempts to control what it
deems to be issuers' "stretching the rules," 93 it may have exceeded
congressional intent and stretched the arbitrage regulations to include
financings which were not motivated by arbitrage profits.9 4
IV. Legislative Intent and Judicial Interpretation
A. Congressional Intent
The legislative history of section 103(c) suggests that its sponsors
intended to curb arbitrage profits realized by local governments with-
out curtailing the flexibility municipalities required to meet their
financing needs. Although section 103(c) was intended to limit the use
of financing techniques that produced arbitrage profit, it was not
intended to eliminate all arbitrage effects. For example, the drafters
provided special rules and exceptions regarding temporary invest-
ments, minor proceed investments, and reserve fund investments.9 5
Similarly, Senator Ribicoff, the sponsor of the bill, expressed the need
to control advance refunding abuses, but indicated that the proposed
restrictions were intended to ensure that profits from an advance
refunding would be "primarily a by-product of the transaction rather
than its essential purpose."9' 6 Senator Ribicoff stated that if an issuer
carefully drafts his bond agreement, he can ensure that his bonds will
not fall within the category of arbitrage bonds. "This aspect of the bill
as well as the exceptions . . . will allow state and local governments
unfettered freedom to engage in any financing arrangement necessary
to achieve the basic purpose of a particular bond issue." 97
92. See note 61 supra.
93. See note 61 supra.
94. Some municipal issuers consider Rev. Rul. 80-13 another example of the IRS's
restrictive application of arbitrage regulations which goes beyond the meaning of the
statute. I.R.C. § 103(c)(2)(B) (P-H 1981), states that bonds will be considered arbi-
trage bonds if their proceeds replace funds that directly or indirectly were used to
acquire higher yielding securities. In Rev. Rul. 80-13, however, the IRS held that a
bond issue was a replacement issue when the proceeds would be used to finance a
feasability study, and when the state would yearly appropriate funds equal to the
cost of the study for any given year. The IRS stated that the bonds replaced the yearly
appropriations even though the appropriations would not be available to the issuer
until the future. See Gill, Arbitrage, 12 UrB. LAW., 534, 537 (1980). See also Limits
of Section 103 (c), supra note 54, at 442-52.
95. See note 17 supra.




The Treasury Department, however, has not always complied with
this legislative purpose. For example, the Department contends that
arbitrage restrictions should be directed not only at financings where
a "principal purpose" of the transaction is to produce arbitrage profit,
but also at any financing where the "effect" is to produce arbitrage
profit."' Although the Treasury Department concedes that the legis-
lators' language and rhetoric looked primarily at the purpose of the
financing to determine if the transaction involved impermissible arbi-
trage, it nonetheless maintains that "every attempt to define arbitrage
has looked to the effect of the transaction rather than its purpose. ' 99
In order to reconcile its position with the legislative language, the
Treasury Department adopted the presumption that the "purpose" of
a transaction is to produce arbitrage profits if the "effect" of the
transaction produces material amounts of arbitrage. It reasoned that
material arbitrage profits act as an inducement for the bond issue. 100
B. State of Washington v. Commissioner
The state of Washington was one of the first tax exempt issuers to
challenge an arbitrage regulation.10 In State of Washington v. Com-
missioner,"12 the Tax Court held that the state's bonds were not arbi-
trage bonds under section 103(c), and invalidated part of an arbitrage
regulation which it held was inconsistent with the legislative intent.
This is the first case to suggest that the Treasury Department has
exceeded its authority by infringing upon municipal financings with
its arbitrage restrictions.
In State of Washington, the state proposed the issuance of advance
refunding bonds to redeem a series of outstanding school revenue
bonds. 103 The refunding issue was intended to enable the state to take
98. Lttr. Rul. 7947117, Aug. 27, 1979 (examines the development of the arbitrage
regulations and presents the Treasury Department's position on the financings analo-
gous to the one described in State of Washington v. Commissioner). See notes 110-12
infra and accompanying text.
99. Lttr. Rul. 7947117, Aug. 27, 1979.
100. Id.
101. See note 39 supra. An earlier challenge of the Treasury Regulations regarding
restrictions on Industrial Development bonds occurred in Fairfax County Economic
Dev. Auth. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 546 (1981).
102. 77 T.C. 656 (1981).
103. The state issued the 30 years Revenue Bonds on April 21, 1971, yielding
between six and eight percent. At the time of the state's ruling request, there were
$19,880,000 in outstanding bonds. The outstanding bonds are limited revenue obli-
gations of the state, and are payable only from specific revenues of certain pledged
trust funds. Because they are not backed by the full taxing powers of the state, their
credit rating is lower, and their interest is higher than general obligations bonds. Id.
at 657-59.
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advantage of lower interest rates and more advantageous issuing con-
ditions. 10 4 The state planned to invest the proceeds of the new issue
until the outstanding bonds' maturity. To ensure that the invested
bonds would not be classified as arbitrage bonds, the state intended to
acquire federal securities which would produce a yield that would not
exceed the yield of the refunding bonds. 10 5  The state requested a
private letter ruling to determine whether the proposed bonds were
arbitrage bonds, and whether the interest was exempt from taxation.
The IRS ruled that the bonds would be arbitrage bonds because the
state had deducted its issuance costs from the bonds' purchase price in
computing yield, in violation of the regulations. 06 The proceeds of
the refunding issue, according to the IRS, were invested above the
permissible yield.
The state appealed to the Tax Court, challenging the IRS's determi-
nation of the elements used to compute the yield. The conflict be-
tween the IRS and the state centers on the parties' different methods
of determining the "purchase price," which is an important factor in
determining the yield of the issue. 10 7  The state asserted that the
purchase price was the money received for the refunding bonds less
administrative costs and underwriter's commission, and that the regu-
lation was invalid because it did not allow municipalities to recover
expenses incurred by issuing bonds. The IRS contended, however,
that the purchase price should be the initial offering price of the bonds
to the public, and would not permit the administrative expenses or the
underwriter's commission to reduce the purchase price.108
The Tax Court examined the legislative history of the statute to
determine the congressional definition of the term "yield" as used with
104. See notes 41-49 supra and accompanying text. A provision in the 1971 reve-
nue bond resolution required the state to maintain a reserve account of at least two
times the maximum amount of principal and interest due on the bonds in any given
year.
After issuing these bonds, the state amended its constitution so that the state was
authorized to pledge its full faith, credit and taxing power to pay debt service on new
bonds. The state then planned to issue refunding bonds which had a higher credit
rating because the bonds were backed by the credit of the state, and therefore,
carried a lower interest rate than the old bonds. Moreover, the refunding bonds were
not required to be secured by a reserve account, so the state could use the accumu-
lated money in the reserve account to reduce the principal. 77 T.C. at 657-62.
105. Id. at 664.
106. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(d).
107. Elements used in the yield calculation include the bond's original purchase
price, its redemption price, and its coupon rate. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(c)(1)(ii).
108. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(d). The Treasury Department instituted this restric-
tion in 1978 to prevent issuers from recovering their costs, see note 51 supra. The




respect to municipal arbitrage and noted that all legislative records
referred to municipal arbitrage as profit received by governmental
units from the interest differential between taxable and tax exempt
obligations. 09 The court, therefore, concluded that the primary pur-
pose of Congress in enacting section 103(c) was to eliminate this
"profit" element of arbitrage. In addition, the court found that the
IRS's interpretation of yield in the regulation 1.103-13(d), requiring
that the municipality bear the costs of the issue," 0 was at "odds with
the legislative history and the totality of circumstances surrounding
the enactment of section 103(c) ... "I"
The court noted that the statutory terms were "far from clear,"1 1 2
because the term "yield," as interpreted by the IRS, draws an invalid
comparison between the bondholders' return on the issue and the
issuer's return on his investment of the bond proceeds. The compari-
son is invalid because by disallowing the deduction of the issuer's
109. For legislative documents referring to arbitrage as "profit" made by local
governments, see Technical Information Release No. 840 (Aug. 11, 1966), STAND.
FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 6701 (1966); 113 CONG,. REC. 31613 (1967); 113 CONG. REC.
20033 (1967).
110. The court noted that the regulations allowed the administrative costs to be
discounted from the purchase price until 1978 when the IRS repudiated its prior
construction of the statute and disallowed the exclusion of issuing costs. See note 51
supra. The court concluded that when this type of change of position occurs, "the
manner in which it evolved merits inquiry." 77 T.C. at 617 n.12, citing National
Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979). See also Kurzner v.
United States, 413 F.2d 97, 112 (5th Cir. 1969). While the court acknowledged that
the flexibility of administrative regulations enable changes to be enforced without an
act of Congress, Helvering v. Wiltshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90, 101 (1934), and
regulations must be upheld if they "implement the Congressional mandate in some
reasonable manner," United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967), if the
regulation is not consistent "with what Congress surely ... intended the statute to
do, then it cannot stand." 77 T.C. at 675, citing United States v. Cartwright, 411
U.S. 546, 557 (1973). Both the dissent and the IRS in State of Washington main-
tained that the regulation conforms to the statutory scheme and should be upheld by
the court. The dissent asserted that the majority had ignored the Supreme Court's
guidance as to the standards that courts should use in questioning the validity of a
regulation. 77 T.C. at 678. "These regulations command our respect, for Congress
has delegated to the Secretary of Treasury, not to this Court, the task of 'administer-
ing the tax laws of the Nation.' " 77 T.C. at 678, citing Commissioner v. Portland
Cement Co., 450 U.S. 156, 169 (1981), citing United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S.
546, 550 (1973). The Treasury Department claimed that the regulation barring the
recovery of administrative expenses reduced the number of advance refundings
which the Department contended was a major source of arbitrage abuse, thereby
promoting the congressional purpose behind § 103(c). Lttr. Rul. 794117, Aug. 27,
1979. The Department also argued that § 103(c)(6), which grants the Secretary of
Treasury the power to promulgate regulations, should strengthen the Treasury De-
partment's interpretation of the regulation. Id. See 77 T.C. at 666.
111. 77 T.C. at 672.
112. Id. at 669.
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costs, it does not accurately measure the issuer's actual return on its
investment. 1 3 The court held that the IRS
accentuates the difference between "yield" and the issuer's costs
and, in our opinion, expands the net of 103(c)(2) to encompass a
formula for determining profits which sweeps in a fictious element
of profit and goes beyond what is necessary to achieve the legisla-
tive purpose of the statutory provision." 4
The court also determined that because the Treasury Department
declined to define arbitrage, and specifically requested that Congress
do so, the IRS would have to issue regulations in accord with the
congressional "anti-profit" intent. The court acknowledged that regu-
lations should be upheld if they reasonably enforced a congressional
mandate, 1 5 and recognized that, in this case, Congress granted the
Treasury Department broad rulemaking power. It held, however,
that the regulation was inconsistent with Congressional intent and
beyond the bounds of permissible administrative flexibility, since the
regulation resulted in a diminution of funds used by municipal and
state governments for carrying out their valid public purposes." 6
113. The Treasury Department, however, argued that "yield" should be given its
ordinary business meaning, Malat v. Riddel, 383 U.S. 569 (1966), and that the IRS's
application of yield in this instance is consistent with the legislative purpose behind §
103(c). Lttr. Rul. 794117, Aug. 27, 1979. The sponsors of the bill referred to
arbitrage bonds as bonds invested at a yield higher than the yield on the bond itself,
see notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text, and the Treasury Department main-
tains, therefore, that the discussion of yield in the legislative records does not suggest
that yield should have any other meaning but the ordinary one. The Department also
argued that yield appears in relatively close proximity within the statute and should
be interpreted consistently.
[A]rbitrage bonds means any obligation . . . used . . . (a)-to acquire
securities ... expected . . . to produce a yield over the term of the issue
which is materially higher (taking into account any discount or premium)
than the yield on obligations of such issue ....
I.R.C. § 103(c) (emphasis added). The first time yield is referred to, it means rate of
return. The Treasury Department maintains that this definition should be applied to
yield the second time it appears in the statute. Lttr. Rul. 794117, Aug. 27, 1979.
Instead, the Tax Court appears to define the second yield to mean cost to the
borrower. See 77 T.C. at 669. The Treasury Department's argument is supported by
the dissent, which mentions that although the term yield appears twice in the statute,
the majority neither gives the term its ordinary meaning nor interpreted yield consist-
ently and, therefore, failed to give the Code "as great an internal symmetry and
consistency as its words permit." Id. at 677, citing Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S.
299, 304 (1961), citing United States v. Olympic Radio & Tel., 349 U.S. 232, 235
(1955) (Chabot, J., dissenting).
114. 77 T.C. at 669.
115. Id. at 675, citing United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967).




The Treasury Department is concerned that arbitrage restrictions
will be distorted by municipal issuers to achieve unfair tax advan-
tages." While the IRS is committed to controlling abuse, its enforce-
ment has restricted some financings to the point that they are no
longer feasible. 18 The regulations also have had the effect of reduc-
ing the number of advance refunding bonds issued by municipal
governments." I 9 While the IRS believes that regulating the issuance
of these bonds enables it to reduce a major source of arbitrage
abuse, 120 municipal issuers believe that these restrictions constitute
unauthorized control of the bond market by the IRS.'21 Municipali-
ties have found that the IRS's application of the arbitrage provisions
has continued to expand, prohibiting increasing numbers of financ-
ings and creating a feeling of uncertainty among municipal issuers.122
Consequently, local governments have constrained future financ-
ings 2 3 for fear that the IRS may declare the bond issues taxable for
violating the arbitrage provisions.
Revenue Ruling 80-328 and the Tax Court's opinion in State of
Washington v. Commissioner, however, suggest that the Treasury
Department may have exceeded its authority to regulate arbitrage and
may have gone beyond the legislative purpose of section 103(c). The
arbitrage statute is intended to control blatant arbitrage abuses.
Therefore, regulations and revenue rulings which inhibit transactions
not motivated by arbitrage profit may be invalid for exceeding the
legislative purpose of section 103(c).
Carol L. Gruendel
117. Tax Trends, supra note 5, at 135.
118. See notes 79-84 supra and accompanying text.
119. Lttr. Rul. 794117, Aug. 27, 1979.
120. See note 41 supra.
121. See generally NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BOND LAWYERS-ARBITRAGE OUTLINES
AND MATERIALS 1-11(1981).
122. Id. at 1-11.
123. Id. at 1-10.
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